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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TESCO AMERICAN, INC., a Utah corporation, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
RICHARD T. LETHER, d/b/a ; 
UTAH MACHINE TOOL EXCHANGE, ; 
Defendant/Appellee. ] 
) Appeal No. 930501 
) Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal was originally in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j). This appeal was poured over to the Court of Appeals on 
November 26, 1993, thus empowering this court to decide this matter under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in applying UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607 to 
the undisputed facts of this matter in determining whether there was an accord and 
satisfaction between the parties. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1192 
(Utah 1993). 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes are dispositive of this appeal: 
1. UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607 provides in full as follows: 
The negotiation of an instrument marked "paid in full," "payment in 
full," "full payment of a claim," or words of similar meaning, or the 
negotiation of an instrument accompanied by a statement containing such 
words or words of similar meaning, does not establish an accord and 
satisfaction which binds the payee or prevents the collection of any remaining 
amount owed upon the underlying obligation, unless the payee personally, or 
by an officer or employee with actual authority to settle claims, agrees in 
writing to accept the amount stated in the instrument as full payment of the 
obligation. 
2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-711 provides in full as follows: 
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the 
buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to 
any goods involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the 
whole contract (Section 70A-2-612), the buyer may cancel and whether or not 
he has done so may in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been 
paid 
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to 
all the goods affected whether or not they have been identified to the 
contract; or 
(b) recover damages for nondelivery as provided in this 
chapter (Section 70A-2-713). 
(2) Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer may 
also 
(a) if the goods have been identified recover them as 
provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-502); or 
(b) in a proper case obtain specific performance or replevy 
the goods as provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-716). 
(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a 
buyer has a security interest in goods in his possession or control for any 
payments made on their price and any expenses reasonably incurred in their 
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inspection, receipt, transportation, care and custody and may hold such goods 
and resell them in like manner as an aggrieved seller (Section 70A-2-706). 
3. UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-713 provides in full as follows: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this chapter with respect to proof of 
market price (Section 70A-2-723), the measure of damages for nondelivery or 
repudiation by the seller is the difference between the market price at the time 
when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any 
incidental and consequential damages provided in this chapter (Section 70A-
2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach. 
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in 
cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of 
arrival. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is an action by plaintiff/appellant Tesco American, Inc. 
("Tesco") for damages as a result of a breach of contract by defendant/appellee Utah Machine 
Tool Exchange ("Utah Machine") when Utah Machine failed to deliver machinery. Tesco 
paid the full purchase price, but instead of delivering the machinery to Tesco as agreed, Utah 
Machine attempted to sell it for a higher price to another buyer. Tesco first brought an action 
for breach and nondelivery and later amended the complaint to plead a claim for conversion. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: The complaint was filed originally 
in the Third Circuit Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Civil No. 92 001 2987 CV) on 
September 14, 1992, stating claims for breach of contract and nondelivery of goods. Later, 
Tesco discovered that Utah Machine had in fact obtained the purchased items, but was trying 
to sell them at a higher price to another buyer. Tesco filed an amended complaint on 
December 29, 1992, adding a claim for conversion. This matter was transferred to the district 
court on May 24, 1993, after it was determined that Tesco's damages would exceed the 
circuit court's jurisdictional limit. 
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On March 18, 1993, Utah Machine filed a motion for summary judgment. The 
district court granted that motion on June 25, 1993, and judgment was entered on July 13, 
1993. The parties stipulated to a dismissal of Utah Machine's counterclaim, and the 
counterclaim was dismissed on September 10, 1993. Tesco filed its notice of appeal on 
October 5, 1993. The appeal was poured over to the Court of Appeals on November 26, 
1993. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tesco and Utah Machine entered into a contract on May 27, 1992, whereby Tesco 
purchased certain used machinery for Tesco's business. The machinery consisted of a punch, 
sheer, and associated tools and parts. The machinery was purchased on an "as is" basis, 
F.O.B. Florida. (R. 00128). Tesco paid the full purchase price of $15,000 that same day. (R. 
00128, 00178). The purchase invoice stated that title to the machinery passed upon payment 
of the full price. (R. 00128). Utah Machine failed to deliver the machinery as agreed, 
claiming that it could not obtain delivery from its supplier. After Utah Machine failed to 
deliver the machinery, Tesco filed this action on September 15, 1993. By at least October 26, 
1992, Utah Machine obtained possession of the machinery, but did not notify Tesco. (R. 
00052). 
Upon learning that Utah Machine had received the machinery, Tesco sought and was 
granted a pre-judgment writ of replevin by the circuit court. (R. 00132) On October 26, 
1992, Utah Machine attempted to sell the machine to a third person for $19,900, despite 
having already received full payment from Tesco. (R. 00155-156). Prior to Utah Machine's 
attempts to sell the machinery, however, Tesco made repeated demands that Utah Machine 
deliver the machinery to Tesco. (R. 00052). The pre-judgment writ of replevin was 
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dissolved by the circuit court on November 23, 1992. (R. 00130). Tesco subsequently 
amended its complaint to include a cause of action for conversion. (R. 00122). 
After it became clear that Utah Machine would not deliver the machinery, Tesco 
began searching for comparable used machinery. Tesco could not find a suitable used 
substitute, but was able to locate comparable new machinery at a cost of $45,000. (R. 
00034). As a result of the increase in damages for nondelivery of the machinery, Tesco 
transferred the case to the district court. (R. 00013-16, 00005, 00034). 
Utah Machine paid back the purchase price on October 30, 1992. (R. 00099). Utah 
Machine wrote on the back of the check "payment in full" and referred to the original 
invoice. (R. 00100). Tesco negotiated the check, but did not release Utah Machine from the 
original agreement or from Tesco's claims under that agreement. (R. 00034-35). The parties 
did not enter into a subsequent written agreement discharging Utah Machine's obligations 
under the original agreement to deliver the machinery. (R. 00034-35). 
SUMMARY Hi" ARGUMENT 
Fundamental to the recovery of damages for breach of contract is the notion that the 
nonbreaching party is entitled to the benefit of the bargain. In this case, Tesco bargained and 
paid for certain machinery. Utah Machine decided not to deliver the machinery and 
attempted instead to sell it for a higher price. Under article II of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, Tesco's damages are the difference between the contract price and the market price, 
after recovery of the purchase price. The trial court erred when it concluded that Tesco's 
acceptance of that purchase price constituted an accord and satisfaction between the parties 
when there was no independent writing discharging Utah Machine's underlying obligation as 
required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION AND 
APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607 AND THE 
REMEDY PROVISIONS OF THE COMMERCIAL CODE IN 
CONCLUDING THAT TESCO AND UTAH MACHINE HAD 
REACHED AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION THEREBY 
BARRING ANY REMEDIES FOR THE NONDELIVERY OF GOODS 
UNDER THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
When the language of a statute is clear, a court will not "look beyond the language's 
plain meaning to divine legislative intent." Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P.2d 1167, 
1168 (Utah 1981). In Ferro v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 514 (Utah App. 
1992), the court said: "When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean 
what it expresses, and no room is left for construction." Likewise, in West Jordan v. 
Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982), the court noted that "a statute should be applied 
according to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably confused or inoperable." 
The Uniform Commercial Code governs this action because it is a transaction for the 
sale of goods. UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-20-102. Specifically, Tesco's second claim for relief 
for nondelivery of goods is governed by UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70A-2-711 and 2-713. Utah 
Machine's defense of accord and satisfaction, because it is based on the negotiation of a 
check, is governed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607. 
A. The Court Failed To Apply UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607 
According To Its Plain Meaning 
Whether an accord and satisfaction exists is determined by the Uniform Commercial 
Code as follows: 
The negotiation of an instrument marked "paid in full," "payment in 
full," "full payment of a claim," or words of similar meaning, or the 
negotiation of an instrument accompanied by a statement containing such 
words or words of similar meaning, does not establish an accord and 
satisfaction which binds the payee or prevents the collection of any remaining 
amount owed upon the underlying obligation, unless the payee personally, or 
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by an officer or employee with actual authority to settle claims, agrees in 
writing to accept the amount stated in the instrument as full payment of the 
obligation. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607. The terms of the statute could hardly be clearer. Section 3-
607 provides without any qualification that, as a matter of law, there is no accord and 
satisfaction as to an underlying obligation unless there is an agreement in writing to that 
effect. 
Utah Machine argued below that certain pre-section 3-607 decisions governed the 
issue of accord and satisfaction, and the trial court seemed persuaded that Tesco's negotiation 
of the check from Utah Machine marked "payment in full" constituted an accord and 
satisfaction despite the clear terms of § 3-607. Applied to the undisputed facts of this case, 
however, that section clearly protects Tesco's negotiation of the check and requires a new 
agreement, in writing, between the parties.1 
Under the plain language of § 3-607, negotiating a check with a restrictive 
endorsement does not effect an accord and satisfaction. A separate written agreement is 
required. Therefore, Utah Machine's check marked payment in full cannot by itself constitute 
the writing contemplated by § 3-607. Without a writing expressing the intent of the parties to 
settle and discharge an underlying obligation, there can be no accord and satisfaction. 
1
 Several cases decided prior to the enactment of § 3-607 aid the court in determining the contents of the 
writing contemplated by § 3-607. For example, Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304, 1308 
(Utah 1987), held that an accord and satisfaction requires "an offer and acceptance and a meeting of the minds." 
See also Bennion v. LeGrande Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Utah 1985) (accord and 
satisfaction require that the parties to a contract "mutually agree that a different performance than that required 
by the original contract will be made in substitution of the performance originally agreed upon. . . . " Utah 
Machine relied on Estate Landscape v. Mountain States Telephone, 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992) as authority for 
the argument that cashing a check marked payment in full is an accord and satisfaction. Although it is not clear 
whether the trial court relied on that case, it is clear that the court was adjudicating facts that pre-dated the 1990 
enactment of § 70A-3-607. See L. 1990, Ch. 312 §1, effective April 23, 1990. Estate Landscaping and other 
decisions, such as Morton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985), relied on in Estate Landscaping, 
were based on claims that arose prior to the enactment of subsection (2) of 1-207 and all of § 3-607. 
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B. The Trial Court Erred In Its Application Of The Remedy Provisions 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-711 and 2-713 To The Undisputed Facts 
Of This Matter 
The remedies provided by the commercial code "shall be liberally administered to the 
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully 
performed." UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-1-106. A buyer damaged by a seller's failure to deliver 
goods under a contract is always entitled to recover the purchase price. That portion of the 
damages for nondelivery is only a threshold to the recovery authorized by the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
A buyer denied the benefit of the bargain may elect one of two remedies as follows: 
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the 
buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to 
any goods involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the 
whole contract (Section 70A-2-612), the buyer may cancel and whether or not 
he has done so may in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been 
paid 
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to 
all the goods affected whether or not they have been identified to the 
contract; or 
(b) recover damages for nondelivery as provided in this 
chapter (Section 70A-2-713). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-711 (Emphasis added). 
Damages for nondelivery are determined as follows: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this chapter with respect to proof of 
market price (Section 70A-2-723), the measure of damages for nondelivery or 
repudiation by the seller is the difference between the market price at the time 
when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any 
incidental and consequential damages provided in this chapter (Section 70A-
2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach. 
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in 
cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of 
arrival. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-713 (Emphasis added). 
The trial court refused to apply these provisions to the undisputed facts of this action. 
(R. 00216). The court ruled instead that Tesco was not entitled to damages measured by the 
benefit of the bargain and that a return of the purchase price was alone sufficient and was an 
accord and satisfaction. (R. 00218).2 The trial court did not consider the damages provisions 
of the Utah Commercial Code available when a seller fails to deliver goods under an 
agreement. In this case, it was undisputed that Tesco had to seek a replacement machine on 
the open market. The only comparable machine was a new one, with a price of $45,000. (R. 
at 00034.) The difference between the contract price at the time of the breach and the market 
price constitutes the measure of damages, along with incidental and consequential damages. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-713. 
The remedy provisions of the commercial code protect an aggrieved buyer's 
expectations and are designed to put the buyer as far as possible in the same position it would 
have enjoyed had the seller performed. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-1-1U6; WHITE & 
SUMMERS § 6-4, at 222 ("[presumably, the typical aggrieved buyer will persist in his desire 
to own the goods that he did not acquire from the breaching seller. . . .") 
Thus, recovery of the purchase price merely begins rather than ends the calculation of 
damages and cannot constitute an accord and satisfaction without a written agreement 
discharging the underlying obligation. In Palmer v. Idaho Peterbuilt, Inc., 641 P.2d 346 
(Idaho App. 1982), for example, the seller argued that the buyer's acceptance of a purchase 
price refund "should have been the end of the matter." Id. at 347. The court recognized, 
however, that a refund of the purchase price marked only the beginning of the available 
remedies: "By accepting the refund in this case, the buyer simply received so much of the 
price as he had paid. He was still entitled to his additional remedies under section [28-2-711 
2
 See 3 HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-713, at 364 (1982); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-4, at 222 (2d ed. 1980) (illustrating the benefit of the bargain concept). 
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of Idaho's commercial code]." Id. at 348. See also Welken v. Conley, 252 N.W.2d 311, 21 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1304, 1308 (N.D. 1977); Jon-T Farms, Inc. v. Goodpasture, Inc., 21 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1309, 1318 (Tex. App. 1977) (aggrieved buyer is "free to choose between 
damages based upon the difference between the contract price and the cost of cover under 
§ 2-712, and damages for nondelivery, consisting of the difference between the market price 
at the time when the buyer learns of the breach and the contract price under § 2-713(a)"). 
In this case, the trial court seems to have overlooked the fact that Utah Machine 
obtained possession of the goods, but still refused to deliver them to Tesco despite Tesco's 
having paid the full purchase price (title to the goods had already passed to Tesco pursuant to 
the terms of the purchase invoice, hence the claim for conversion (R. 00128)).3 Through a 
writ of replevin, Tesco removed the goods from Utah Machine, only to have the writ 
dissolved. (R. at 00180.)4 However, Utah Machine then tried to sell the goods for $19,900 
(R. 00052-53), apparently hoping to turn a quick profit before returning the purchase price to 
Tesco. Tesco's need for the machinery did not end with a return of the purchase price, 
however. Tesco was forced through no fault of its own to shop for substitute machinery. (R. 
00034). 
Utah Machine was not entitled to be rescued from what the trial court called "a bad 
deal" (R. 00213), especially when it could have performed under the agreement by simply 
delivering the machinery as promised. Tesco obviously needed the items it had purchased 
and went so far as to secure a court-ordered replevin. Having cashed a check for a return of 
3
 Utah Machine originally argued that it was free to sell the machinery to another buyer because Tesco had 
rescinded the contract. (R. 00066). Realizing that UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-720 allows an aggrieved party to 
both cancel a contract and recover damages for its breach, Utah Machine abandoned that position altogether. 
(R. 00207, 00212). Indeed, Utah Machine did not even file a reply memorandum in support of its motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 00173). 
4
 Replevin or specific performance is also one of the remedies available to an aggrieved buyer. UTAH CODE 
ANN. §70A-2-711(2)(b). 
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the purchase price, however, Tesco merely recovered, as was its right, "so much of the price 
as [had] been paid M UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-711. 
In other words, Tesco could have recovered the price through litigation under § 2-
711. Recovery of the funds without the aid of a judgment does not mean that Tesco was 
made whole. Without a writing setting forth an accord and satisfaction discharging the 
"underlying obligation," cashing the check was only the first step in the remedy for breach. 
Id.; UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607. See, e.g., Productora E Importadore De Papel, S.A. 
DeC.V. v. Fleming, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 729, 735 (Mass. 1978); Parker v. Rod Johnson 
Farm Service, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 1129, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1263 (Ind. App. 1979). 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment was based on a two-fold error. The court 
first misinterpreted § 3-607 and then seemed to not even consider the remedy provisions of 
the commercial code. (R. 00213-215). By limiting Tesco to a return of the purchase price, a 
remedy to which it is entitled as a matter of law under § 2-711, the trial court blocked Tesco 
from realizing the benefit of the contract breached by Utah Machine. The principle of the 
benefit of the bargain guides all of the remedy provisions of article II of the commercial code. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-1-106.5 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Utah Machine must be 
reversed. By accepting the purchase price, Tesco did no more than exercise its rights as 
expressly allowed under UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-711. There was no written agreement 
that constituted an accord and satisfaction as defined in UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607. 
5
 The trial court replaced the rather mechanical application of §§ 2-711 and 2-713, as well as § 3-607, with a 
qualitatively different standard, one that imposes a "duty of care" on the aggrieved buyer. (R. 00214-215). The 
only duty imposed on the buyer is that of mitigating its damages. In this case, it was undisputed that Tesco 
began searching for replacement machinery, first on the used market. When that was unsuccessful, Tesco was 
forced to look to new machinery to meet its needs. During the interim, Tesco was forced to contract out work 
it could have performed in-house. (R. 00034). 
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Tesco is entitled to the benefit of its bargain. Accordingly, this court should reverse the trial 
court's entry of summary judgment and enter judgment in favor of Tesco in the amount of 
$30,000. or remand the case for a trial on the issue of damages only. 
DATED this g 3 T d a y of December, 1993. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
A Professional Corporation 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
By. iflLD o~*4* 
ELLEN MAYCOC 
DAVID C. WRIG1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM TO 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Pursuant to the court's request of December 28, 1993, appellant respectfully submits 
this addendum to its appellate brief. 
DATED this 29th day of December, 1993. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
A Professional Corporation 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
By_ 
LUVS 
ELLEN MAYCOCI 
DAVID C. WRIGH1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
ADDENDUM INDEX 
1. Utah Machine Tool Exchange Invoice No. 6046, date received 5/27/92. 
2. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated July 13,1993. 
3. Judgment dated July 13, 1993. 
Tabl 
:$m UTAH MACHINE TOOL EXCHANGE 
#83 ScH, NavVp Street (1350 W«t ) 
S«* U U CHy, UtA 84104.1*1? 
Phono: 801-328-0508 
FAX: 80I-32S-06I3 
Bill To: 
TESCO WILLI&MSEN . 
1925 Indiana Ave. 
Offer to ttll ami acceptance stated 
en back of this invoke. 
Ship To: 
SAME 
INVOICE 
6046 
s a l t Lake City/ Utah 84104 
DATE RECEIVED | CUST, P.6T 
5 - 2 7 - 9 2 
DATE SHIPPED 
QUANTITY 
1 LOT 
B/L NO. 
SERIAL NO-
SHIP VIA 
GENERAL DESCRIPTION" 
USED PUNCH, SHEAE, TOOLS, 
AS INSPECTED, AS I S 
FOB FLORIDA 
SHIP FREIGHT COLLECT 
10* OF DECK SPACE 
% 8000# 
PARTS 
UNIT PRICE 
NO TAX 
|*B19791 
PRICE 
$15,000 
TITLE OOCS NOT PASS UNTIL TOTAL PWCE IS PAID IN FUi-L TOTAL DUE • 115,000 
PAID 
It is ike u**.r * responsibility to provide proper safety device* and equip-
mrnl or means that may be neoaaary to wfeguard the operator from 
harm for »ny particular u*, operating, or e* up unci to adequately sale-
guard trw- A1W>V<- machine or machines to meet O.S.H.A. safety ttandanfc, 
I'Vcr shaft use and frqiiire Ms employes to "*> all safety devices, guar* 
and ))ntper *afe c^rating procedure* as set forth in manual and in-
«truetion sheets from the manufacturer. User shall not remove any such 
oVvScf or guard or warning wgn. If user fait* to comply, he agrees to 
iridetmvty and save seller harmless from any liability incurred to per-
sons injured dirartlv or indirecdr in connection with the operation /?. crtAA./) Urrtl*-
Tab 2 
7rancis J. Nielson 2411 
S.RNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON 
attorney for Defendant 
ilO South Main Street, Suite 1305 
5alt Lake City, Utah 84101 
relephone: (801)322-0524 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
rESCO AMERICAN, INC., : 
\ Utah Corporation, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
Plaintiff, 
/s. 
RICHARD T. LETHER, dba Civil No. 930902937 
UTAH MACHINE TOOL EXCHANGE, : 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant. : 
This cause having come on to be heard on Motion of defendant for summary 
ludgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56 on the 25th day of June, 1993, at the hour of 9:30 
i.m., the Honorable David S. Young, Judge presiding; Francis J. Nielson having appeared for 
the defendant and David C. Wright having appeared for the plaintiff, and the Court having 
considered the defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Richard T. Lether's 
Affidavit in support of the Motion, and plaintiffs Memorandum, together with the Affidavit of 
William S. Brugger in opposition to the Motion, and having heard oral argument, and having 
found there is no genuine of fact, with respect to plaintiffs claims against defendant, to be 
1 
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Judge David S. Young 
submitted to the trial court, and good cause appearing, therefore, now makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On May 27, 1992, Richard T. Lether, dba Utah Machine Tool Exchange 
(Richard) purchased certain equipment from Calissi Properties, Inc. (Calissi) for resale to the 
plaintiff, Tesco American, Inc. (Tesco). 
2. On May 27, 1992, Richard sold the equipment to Tesco for $15,000.00. 
3. Tesco paid Richard $15,000.00 for the equipment with his check number 
011338, dated May 27, 1992. 
4. Richard paid Calissi $12,750.00 for the equipment with his check number 
9533, dated May 27, 1992. 
5. Richard purchased the equipment from Calissi with the understanding it 
would be shipped upon receipt of payment in full. 
6. Calissi failed to perform as agreed in that it did not ship the equipment 
upon receipt of payment in full from Richard. 
7. Richard, through counsel and the Economic Crime Unit of the Attorney's 
General's Office of the State of Florida, pressed Calissi to perform without success. 
8. On August 21, 1992, James R. Kruse of the law firm of Kruse, Landa and 
May cock demanded of Richard formally to repay the amount of $15,000.00 to Tesco, plus 
2 
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interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from May 27, 1992, to the date of the 
payment, together with $200.00 in attorney's fees, and for costs incurred in connection with 
asserting the demand. 
9. James R. Kruse sent another communication to Richard on August 24, 
1992, reiterating Tesco's demand to refund the $15,000.00, plus interest, attorney's fees and 
reimbursement of $622.00 in air fare for the representative of Tesco to travel to Florida to 
inspect the machine that Richard had agreed to sell to Tesco. 
10. On September 11, 1992, Richard's attorney, Irene Warr, wrote to Ellen 
Maycock suggesting a method by which the $15,000.00 could be refunded if Richard could not 
secure the machine from Calissi. 
11. On September 16, 1992, Tesco's attorney, Ellen Maycock, wrote to 
Richard's attorney, Irene Warr, outlining a method by which Richard could refund the 
$15,000.00, plus interest, attorney's fees, costs and air fare incurred by Tesco to inspect the 
machine. 
12. On or about September 15, 1992, Tesco filed suit against Richard. 
13. On or about October 15, 1992, Ray Ciarci of Calissi advised Richard that 
the equipment was available and Richard arranged for the machine to be shipped to Salt Lake 
City. 
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14. On or about October 27, 1992, Tesco secured an Order for a Pre-Judgment 
Writ of Replevin and took the equipment into its possession. 
15. On or about November 24, 1992, the court entered an order requiring 
Tesco to return the equipment to Richard. 
16. At the hearing on Tesco's Order to Show Cause why its Order for Pre-
judgment Writ of Replevin should not be continued in effect during the pendency of the action, 
Richard stated in open court that he would be willing to refund the $15,000.00 immediately. 
17. Tesco, through its counsel, Ellen Maycock, instructed Richard to deliver 
the $15,000.00 check to her office. 
18. Richard paid the $15,000.00 with his check number 9825, dated October 
30, 1992. 
19. Richard wrote "payment in full repayment on #6046 per court." 
20. Tesco's president, William S. Brugger, endorsed the check and deposited 
it. 
21. After having deposited the check with the restrictive endorsement, Tesco 
continued with its lawsuit and filed its First Amended Complaint seeking an award of 
compensatory damages of $15,000.00, for an award of incidental and consequential damages in 
an amount to be proven at trial, its attorney's fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of the 
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action, and for an award of exemplary and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at 
trial. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There are no genuine issues of fact relating to the defense of accord and 
satisfaction to be submitted to the trial court. 
2. The Court has reviewed the facts in the light most favorable to Tesco, the 
non-moving party. 
3. Tesco's subjective intentions reflected in its claims that it cashed the 
$15,000.00 check from Richard with the understanding that it constituted a return of its purchase 
money only, that it did not intend to release Richard from any claims and that the parties did 
not enter into any agreement, written or otherwise, to the effect that the return of the purchase 
price was an accord and satisfaction between them, are irrelevant. 
4. Tesco's conduct reflected in the demand letters to Richard for 
reimbursement of the $15,000.00, the discussions in open court in which Richard agreed to 
refund the entire $15,000.00 purchase price and the endorsement of the $15,000.00 check by 
Tesco's president, William S. Brugger, is conclusive proof of acceptance of the accord and 
satisfaction by Tesco. 
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5. Richard has established the defense of accord and satisfaction by 
demonstrating that there was a bona fide dispute over an unliquidated amount, that a payment 
was tendered by Richard in full settlement of the entire dispute, and that Tesco accepted the 
payment. 
6. Richard is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Tesco's First Amended 
Complaint against him with prejudice. 
6. Richard is not entitled to summary judgment on his Counterclaim because 
there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether a press brake attachment was returned with the rest 
of the machine. 
DATED this {Vd* day of July, 1993. 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Third District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of July, 1993, I mailed, postage prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
to the following: 
David C. Wright 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Francis J. Nielson 2411 e.r_. 
ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON o* — 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-0524 
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IN THE THIRD-effietJIT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
.'•iiV 
TESCO AMERICAN, INC., 
A Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD T. LETHER, dba 
UTAH MACHINE TOOL EXCHANGE, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 930902937 
Judge David S. Young 
This cause having come on to be heard on Motion of defendant for summary 
judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56 on the 25th day of June, 1993, at the hour of 9:30 
a.m., the Honorable David S. Young, Judge presiding; Francis J. Nielson having appeared for 
the defendant and David C. Wright having appeared for the plaintiff, and the Court having 
considered the defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Richard T. Lether's 
Affidavit in support of the Motion, and plaintiffs Memorandum, together with the Affidavit of 
William S. Brugger in opposition to the Motion, and having heard oral argument, and having 
found there is no genuine of fact, with respect to plaintiffs claims against defendant, to be 
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submitted to the trial court, and the Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on plaintiffs claims 
against defendant is granted. 
2. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint against defendant is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
3. The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim 
against the plaintiff is denied. 
DATED this I ^ . day of July, 1993. 
DAVID S. YOUNG / 
Third District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following, postage prepaid, this 29th 
day of December, 1993: 
Francis J. Nielson, Esq. 
Arnovitz, Smith & Nielson 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Of c~& 
DAVID C. WRIGHT / 
